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In this paper, we identify the strategic motives of German manufacturing companies in the electrical
engineering and machinery industry to be involved in standards development organizations. First, we
present the general motives for the formation of strategic alliances and relate them to speciﬁc stan-
dardization motives. Then, we identify pursuing speciﬁc company interests, solving technical problems,
knowledge seeking, inﬂuencing regulation, and facilitating market access as motives to standardize by
means of factor analysis. In a second step, we test hypotheses on the relationship between the im-
portance of strategic motives and ﬁrm level variables, e.g. R&D intensity, innovation activities, and ﬁrm
size. The results reveal that ﬁrms in electric engineering and machinery have a particularly strong in-
terest in ensuring industry-friendly design of regulations, which can be achieved by standards. Moreover,
the results conﬁrm that small ﬁrms also from these two sectors are active in standardization alliances to
access knowledge from other involved stakeholders.
& 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).1. Introduction
Firms' involvement in standards setting alliances is attracting
increasing attention within industry, among policy makers and
researchers (Choi et al., 2011; European Commission, 2008). A ﬁrm
participating in standards development organizations (SDOs) can
increase its competitiveness by actively inﬂuencing standards to-
wards its own preferred specializations or by passively gaining
knowledge from the standardization process (e.g. Sherif, 2015).
Our analysis identiﬁes ﬁrms' speciﬁc strategic motives related to
their involvement in standardization committees and their rela-
tion to companies' characteristics.
For policymakers, standards – the results of the standardization
process - play an important role in internalizing externalities and
achieving international trade liberalization. In the European Union
(EU), the introduction of the 'New Approach' to technical harmoni-
zation aims to establish a European Single Market by prescribing
essential health and safety requirements in harmonized standards. At
the global level, international standards gain importance through
Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade of the World Trade Orga-
nization (WTO) (Büthe and Mattli, 2011; Mattli, 2001; Sykes, 1999).r Ltd. This is an open access article
n, Faculty of Economics and
rlin, Germany.
).Given the fundamental impact of standardization on growth
(Blind and Jungmittag, 2008), policymakers in industrialized and
newly-industrialized countries recognize the importance of stan-
dardization for the competitiveness of their economies. Within the
last decade, Canada, China, Germany, Japan, Russia, the UK, and
the USA have implemented national standardization strategies
(Hemphill, 2009; Limin et al., 2005). However, considering that
standards are mainly set by private actors, surprisingly little is
known about ﬁrm-speciﬁc motives towards their involvement in
standardization. Existing literature on ﬁrm strategies in standards
setting is limited to ﬁrms in industry consortia in the information
and telecommunication sector (Chiesa et al., 2002; David and
Steinmueller, 1994; DeLacey et al., 2006; Greenstein and Stango,
2007; Grotne, 2008; Ranganathan and Rosenkopf, 2014), on fac-
tors inﬂuencing standards battles (Shapiro and Varian, 1999), or
dominant designs (Suarez, 2004), e.g., in the case of computer
workstations (see e.g., Khazam and Mowery, 1994). Examples of a
standards battle in SDOs is ODF vs OOXML within ISO (Blind,
2011). However, battles between de facto standards are more
common, like VHS vs. Betamax (Cusumano et al., 1992 or Gallagher
and Park, 2002), or Sony's Blu-ray vs. Toshiba's HD-DVD in blue
laser DVDs (e.g., Gallagher, 2012). Only one recent case study at-
tempts to capture ﬁrms' different motives to standardize in formal
standards setting (Riillo, 2013). To this end, this paper is a ﬁrst
attempt to derive an empirically-based taxonomy of ﬁrms' motives
in standardization alliances organized by ofﬁcially-accreditedunder the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
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among German ﬁrms in the electrical engineering and machinery
industry that participate in national, regional (European) or in-
ternational standards setting processes in formal SDOs. In contrast
to other manufacturing sectors, like the chemical industry, or
services sectors (Wakke et al., 2015), these companies are much
more active in formal SDOs (Blind and Mangelsdorf, 2013) and
have therefore developed more sophisticated strategies. The focus
of our paper is on the formal standardization process as opposed
to de facto standardization.
Whereas de facto standards emerge naturally through market
processes, formal standards arise out of voluntary open and
transparent, consensus based standardization processes of inter-
ested parties organized by SDOs. Formal standards therefore have
greater legitimacy, especially in Europe, and are often of a higher
quality (Belleﬂamme, 2002; Leiponen, 2008). Consensus-based
standards represent coordination within an industrial segment
(Rysman and Simcoe, 2008), despite occasional standard wars
even their occurrences are less likely that in the case in de facto
standards (e.g., Gallagher, 2007; Schilling, 2002; Shapiro and
Varian, 1999; Shurmer and Swann, 1995; Suarez, 2004). Moreover,
formal SDOs in Europe – as opposed to rather informal consortia –
are characterized by government recognition. In the EU, formal
European and national SDOs are recognized by Directive 98/34/EC.
Concurrently, the WTO Agreement on Technical Barriers to trade
requires member states to establish ‘enquire points’ for informa-
tion requests regarding technical regulations, standards, and
conformity assessment procedures (WTO, 1995). This means that
formal standards become legal requirements when governments
mandate the development of technical speciﬁcations to standar-
dization alliances organized by formal SDOs (Tassey, 2000).
With the exception of Axelrod et al. (1995) and Riillo (2013),
who focus on the role of company size, and Van de Kaa and De
Bruijn (2015), who identify the incentives for consensus building,
companies' strategic motives to participate in standardization
have yet not been comprehensively investigated, nor empirically
validated. Consequently, the aim of this paper is twofold. First, we
seek to derive a parsimonious set of motives for ﬁrms to partici-
pate in standardization alliances based on the large body of lit-
erature on strategic alliances. Second, we conduct a study on the
explanatory factors for these motives by focusing on company
speciﬁc variables including R&D intensity, innovation related ac-
tivities, and company size.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The second,
subsequent section gives an overview of the literature, where we
deﬁne the basic terms used throughout the paper and link general
motives of alliance formation to speciﬁc standardization motives. In
the same section, we formulate hypotheses about the relationship
between companies’ characteristics and standardization motives. In
the third section, we provide descriptive statistics of our company
sample and show the importance of various standardization motives.
Next, we reduce the set of standardization motives with the help of
factor analysis in order to derive a typology. The resulting factors are
then explained in multivariate ordinary least squares (OLS) models,
which help us to reveal the relevance of company speciﬁc char-
acteristics for speciﬁc motives. In the last section, we show how our
research contributes to the literature, summarize our results and
derive a set of implications and recommendations for standardiza-
tion management and policy.2. Literature overview and hypotheses
In this section, we ﬁrst deﬁne basic terms used in the paper.
Then, we give general deﬁnitions of strategic alliances and show
why standardization committees are a speciﬁc type of strategicalliance. We employ a literature survey where we combine the two
streams of literature, i.e., the review the literature on motives to
form strategic alliances (the general issue) and link them to
standardization motives (the speciﬁc issue). The resulting list of
motives to participate in standardization alliances is tested in our
empirical analysis in the following sections. Finally, we develop
some general hypotheses regarding the relationship between
company characteristics and the importance of standardization
motives in an area missing both a comprehensive theoretical fra-
mework and empirical investigations in Section 2.2.
2.1. Strategic alliances and standardization alliances organized by
SDOs
2.1.1. Deﬁnitions
Strategic alliances are deﬁned as ‘inter-ﬁrm collaboration over a
given economic space and time for attainment of mutually deﬁned
goals’ (Glaister and Buckley, 1996). They can be classiﬁed according
to geographical (i.e., national versus international) and industry
scope (i.e., intra- versus inter-industry) and to functional areas.
The functional areas encompass several activities in the economic
value chain, i.e. from joint R&D and technology development to
manufacturing alliances and marketing (Varadarajan and Cun-
ningham, 1995). The alliance governance literature has identiﬁed
strategic alliances as opportunities for interﬁrm knowledge
transfer (Kogut, 1988; Hamel, 1991; Doz, 1996). Learning from
external sources has become a central factor for business success:
successful transformation of information enables ﬁrms to exploit
external knowledge internally for new product development
(Cohen and Levinthal, 1990; Zahra and George, 2002). Successful
knowledge acquisition from alliances is positively related to ﬁrm
performance and innovation (Van Wijk et al., 2008).
The following three characteristics are conditions for inter-ﬁrm
collaborations to be considered as strategic alliances: (1) the
partner ﬁrms remain independent after the formation; (2) the
partner ﬁrms share beneﬁts and control over the performance of
assigned tasks; and (3) the partner ﬁrms continuously contribute
to the mutually-deﬁned strategic areas (Yoshino and Rangone,
1995). Standardization alliances qualify as strategic alliances (Blind
and Mangelsdorf, 2013), because they satisfy these three condi-
tions. Based on a consensus decision making process in commit-
tees, participating ﬁrms share control and beneﬁts of the content
of the speciﬁcations. Finally, standardization – deﬁned by De Vries
et al. (2003) as the development or revision of a standard or a
cluster of related standards – involves a continuing contribution
by participants, especially in the form of technical expertize.
Although standardization is considered as a form of strategic
alliance organized by formal SDOs formal SDOs, they feature
speciﬁc elements compared to other alliances and industry con-
sortia. First, standardization alliances organized by SDOs are
characterized by heterogeneity of participants. Beside ﬁrms, con-
sumer organizations and government take sometimes the oppor-
tunity to get involved in standardization (De Vries and Slob, 2006).
Second, outcomes of standardization alliances – the technical
speciﬁcations (standards) – have public good characteristics that
may lead to free riding behavior and non-participation in stan-
dards setting alliances (Cabral and Salant, 2014). However, in-
centives for participation exist because engagement in standardi-
zation can generate private beneﬁts in the form of knowledge
spillovers and reduced costs related to the implementation of the
produced standards (Blind, 2004). Third, SDOs follow a variety of
different rules (Chiao et al., 2007) that inﬂuence the degree of
openness, the level of consensus and the treatment of intellectual
property rights in the standards developed. In general, formal
SDOs provide a neutral platform – neutral in the sense that the
SDOs do not inﬂuence the standards setting process itself.
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The literature on strategic alliances suggests that companies
have a number of different motives for alliances (Kogut, 1988). The
motives range from (1) decreasing market uncertainty;
(2) knowledge acquisition; (3) access to markets; and (4) con-
formance with government policies (Kogut, 1988; Bai, O'Brien,
2008; Beeby and Booth, 2000; Buckley et al., 2009; Deeds and Hill,
1996; Frankel and Schmitz-Whipple, 1996; Glaister and Buckley,
1996; Grant and Baden-Fuller, 2004; Hagedoorn, 1993; Varadar-
ajan and Cunningham 1995). In the remainder of this section, we
discuss these general motives and relate them to speciﬁc motives
in standardization alliances.
2.1.2.1. Decreasing technological and market risks. Alliances allow
risk sharing among participating ﬁrms. Within alliances, ﬁrms can
spread the risk of large projects over more than one ﬁrm, enabling
technology or product diversiﬁcation and consequently the re-
duction of technological and market risks (Glaister and Buckley,
1996; Hagedoorn, 1993; Varadarajan and Cunningham, 1995).
Companies participating in standardization alliances can avoid
– or at least reduce – technology related risks and can reduce
market uncertainty (Swann, 2000). The risk associated with R&D
investments, e.g., failure and unexpectedly higher costs, is reduced
when ﬁrms actively inﬂuence the content of the standard in order
to shape technological trajectories. Consequently, ﬁrms in stan-
dard setting have the incentive to enforce company speciﬁc con-
tent, i.e., technologies, in standards and prevent incompatible or
conﬂicting standards which could lead to sunk investment costs
(Besen and Farrell, 1994; Katz and Shapiro, 1994). Especially, ﬁrms
are keen to join alliances in standards setting that consists of many
ﬁrms in order to increase the probability that the own technology
becomes a dominant standard (Axelrod et al., 1995) or to win a
standards battle (Gomes-Casseres, 1994; Vanhaverbeke and
Noorderhaven, 2001).
2.1.2.2. Knowledge acquisition. Strategic alliances are means of
transferring and exchanging knowledge among ﬁrms (Kogut,
1988; Hamel, 1991; Buckley et al., 2009; Grant and Baden-Fuller,
2004). Knowledge transfer in alliances requires that knowledge
needs to be disclosed by one party and absorbed in the partner
ﬁrms (Easterby-Smith et al., 2008). Alliance partners beneﬁt from
knowledge spillover effects, where knowledge obtained from can
be used by recipient ﬁrms to enhance their own innovation per-
formance (Sampson, 2005) and competitive advantage (Lavie,
2006).
In the paradigm of the resource-based view of the ﬁrm, a ﬁrm's
resources become the center of its strategy in order to achieve a
sustainable competitive advantage (Barney 1991). As argued by
Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven (1996), also external resources, in
form of alliances, can be used to integrate resources external to the
ﬁrm. Alliances are therefore especially attractive for smaller ﬁrms
that lack the resources to invest in R&D (Varadarajan and Cun-
ningham, 1995). Narayanana and Chen (2012) identify knowledge
acquisition as one of companies' motives to join SDOs. Through the
standardization process, companies can complement their own
R&D with access to the technological developments of other ﬁrms
and beneﬁting from unintended knowledge spillovers (Blind,
2006). Moreover, the participation of research institutes and uni-
versities in standard setting leads to the integration of up-to-date
scientiﬁc and technological knowledge in the standards' speciﬁ-
cation (Blind and Gauch, 2009). They can represent industry spe-
ciﬁc problems, but also problems at the company level. Similarly,
Hawkings (1999) identiﬁes standardization consortia as a strategy
for companies to pool their knowledge.
Participation in strategic alliances allows ﬁrms to access other
ﬁrms' technological know–how, which reduces the time todevelop new products and the time to introduce them to market
(Delcamp and Leiponen, 2014). Thus, ﬁrms have an incentive to
participate in strategic alliances in order to exploit ﬁrst mover
advantages (Ranganathan and Rosenkopf, 2014) and capture sig-
niﬁcant market shares (Deeds and Hill, 1996).
In standardization, participating companies beneﬁt vis-à-vis
non-participants because they enjoy earlier knowledge of techni-
cal and regulatory speciﬁcations. This ﬁrst-mover advantage leads
to shorter time to market or to adjust products being already in
the market and thus to a competitive advantage compared to la-
tecomers (Egan, 1998).
2.1.2.3. Access to markets. In the literature, access to markets is a
further motive to join strategic alliances (Beeby and Booth, 2000).
For instance, alliances facilitate entry to foreign markets. Firms
that lack international experience are especially those that join
strategic alliances, for international expansion of their activities
(Glaister and Buckley, 1996).
As for standard-setting alliances, ﬁrms especially active in
network industries, like telecommunication and transportation,
but also computer software and hardware, achieve market access
by setting compatibility standards. Achieving compatibility with
producers of complementary products allows ﬁrms to access
markets of network goods and services (David and Steinmueller,
1994) and to improve their innovation performance (Soh, 2010).
Standardization also enables new markets to emerge by setting
anticipatory standards. They deﬁne interfaces to expected inter-
operability requirements in new network industries prior to the
existence of markets. The UMTS (Universal Mobile Tele-
communications Service) is an example for an anticipatory stan-
dard (Egyedi and Sherif, 2008).
Market acceptance by consumers is related to market access. It
is facilitated through the involvement of multiple stakeholders in
standardization, i.e. the involvement of consumer organizations
and occupational safety organizations facilitate market acceptance
of standardized products by consumers (De Vries and Slob, 2006).
2.1.2.4. Conformity to governmental policies. The market access is
often linked to the conformity to governmental policies. For in-
stance, in international strategic alliances ﬁrms can conform more
easily to local government policies through local partners (Glaister
and Buckley, 1996). Firms also use inter-ﬁrm collaborations to in-
ﬂuence governmental regulations. For instance, Delmas and
Montes-Sancho (2010) analyze voluntary environmental agree-
ments between ﬁrms and regulators. In such agreements partici-
pating ﬁrms have strategic opportunities to inﬂuence the im-
plementation of existing regulations and the content of future
regulations. In addition, companies participating in standardiza-
tion alliances organized by SDOs can also be perceived as “in-
stitutional entrepreneurs”, whose output, i.e. standards, substitute
for already established solutions. According to Hargrave and Van
De Ven (2006), the institutional entrepreneur must also take into
account the regulatory framework and related political processes.
This interaction is supported by the case study of Backhouse et al.
(2006), who identify the role of exogenous contingencies, espe-
cially government pressure, for the development of the ﬁrst in-
formation security management standard.
Besides this reactive behavior, ﬁrms participating in formal
standardization alliances are also actively involved in deﬁning
regulations. This is especially true for ﬁrms in Europe producing
goods and services covered by New Approach Directives. The New
Approach in the European Union delegates responsibilities for
setting market rules to private institutions, i.e. European standar-
dization organizations. Whereas ‘essential requirements’, e.g.
protection of consumer health, are deﬁned in European Directives,
ﬁrms in European standards bodies are able to deﬁne technical
Table 1
Linking alliance formation motives to standardization motives.
Alliance formation motives Standardization motives
 Decreasing
market uncertainty
 Enforce company speciﬁc content
 Prevent conﬂicting standards
 Knowledge transfer  Beneﬁt from unintended knowledge spillovers
 Keep track of other companies' technical
knowledge
 Solve technical problems at industry level
 Solve technical problems at ﬁrm level
 Acquire competitive advantage through head
start in knowledge
 Access to markets  Open up new markets
 Facilitate compatibility with other producers of
complementary products
 Conform to government
policies
 Deﬁne technical speciﬁcations in regulations
 Reduce barriers to trade
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ments of these New Approach Directives (Egan, 2002). Therefore,
ﬁrms in a consensus based decision making process in formal
standardization have incentives to deﬁne technical speciﬁcations
that are favorable for themselves and the whole industry.
Moreover, standards can represent barriers to trade. Especially
idiosyncratic national standards can raise compliance costs and dis-
courage ﬁrms from exporting (Chen et al., 2006). Consequently, ﬁrms
in standards-setting alliances also have the incentive to reduce
technical barriers to trade in order to access foreign markets. Table 1
summarizes the relationship between the general alliance formation
motives and the more particular standardization motives.2.2. Hypotheses about the inﬂuence of companies character-
istics on motives to standardize
Before we conduct the empirical analysis regarding ﬁrms'
standardization motives in the third section, we derive a set of
hypotheses about the relationship between the importance of
standardization motives – i.e., the extent of strategic objectives –
and companies characteristics'. Our hypotheses are based on the
expected correlation between ﬁrm level characteristics and the
general importance of strategic objectives in standardization alli-
ances, but focus on speciﬁc standardization motives. Since there is
only little conceptual and empirical literature about companies'
motives to standardize, we assume a two-stage decision process.
First, companies decide whether to join or not to join standardi-
zation committees. Meanwhile, we can rely on several studies
about companies' characteristics, which drive their involvement in
standardization. Consequently, we assume that these factors have
also an inﬂuence on the various strategic motives within
standardization.
Based on previous research (e.g., Blind, 2006; Blind and Man-
gelsdorf, 2013; Wakke et al., 2015), we know that with increasing
R&D intensity up to a certain threshold, companies are more likely
to join standardization. At ﬁrst, companies with intensive R&D
activities often face problems, which might be solvable in the
context of standardization activities involving companies with si-
milar challenges. In addition, these companies are keen to push
their developed technologies into standards in order to avoid the
dominance of competing technologies. Thirdly, R&D intensive
ﬁrms have a particularly high incentive to act extremely carefully
in standardization, since they face a signiﬁcant risk of losing the
results of their investment in R&D, when entering standardization
activities. Moreover, a ﬁrm's ability to use external knowledge
depends on its absorptive capacity (Cohen and Levinthal, 1989,
1990). Therefore, we particularly expect a positive correlationbetween R&D intensity (as indicator for ﬁrms' absorptive capacity)
and the standardization motive related to ‘knowledge acquisition’.
In summary, we derive the very general Hypothesis 1:
Hypothesis 1. Companies' R&D intensity has a positive inﬂuence
on their assessment of strategic motives to standardize.
Similar to R&D, innovation is a driver for companies' engage-
ment in standardization (e.g., Wakke et al., 2015) innovations that
are new to the market – or market novelties – are introduced by a
ﬁrm to a speciﬁc market for the ﬁrst time. A market can represent
a geographical area or a speciﬁc product line. The geographical
area depends on the ﬁrm's own activities and can include the
domestic market, European or international markets (OECD/
Eurostat, 2005). Due to the “sunk costs” related to investments in
innovation, a ﬁrm introducing market novelties has a strong in-
centive that standards correspond to-or at least do not conﬂict
with - the ﬁrm's new product. We expect that ﬁrms producing
market novelties have an incentive to ensure that newly-devel-
oped standards do not endanger the business success of these
market novelties. This is especially important in the framework of
the ‘New Approach to Technical Harmonization’ of the European
Union, where compliance with mandatory European regulations is
linked to compliance with voluntary European standards (Egan,
2002). Through the ‘New Approach’, standardization becomes an
important element of the regulatory infrastructure (Blind, 2008).
Therefore, we expect that – in addition to the importance of
standardization in facilitating market access – the importance of
motives related to ‘government regulations’ is positively linked to
ﬁrms producing market novelties. However, in a similar fashion as
for the ﬁrst hypothesis, we derive a general Hypothesis 2:
Hypothesis 2. Companies with innovations new to the market
have a stronger emphasis on strategic motives to standardize.
Based on theoretical considerations, e.g., the ﬁx-cost effect
connected with an investment in standardization and numerous
empirical studies (e.g., Blind and Thumm, 2004; Blind, 2006; Blind
and Mangelsdorf, 2013; Wakke et al., 2015), we know that larger
companies are more likely to participate in standardization. Con-
sequently, we also can expect a positive correlation between
company size and the importance of standardization motives,
because larger ﬁrms have more ﬁnancial and human resources
devoted to standardization and therefore a stronger bargaining
position in standardization processes. As such, larger ﬁrms will
translate the greater bargaining power into more explicit
strategies.
As argued above, smaller companies face relatively higher costs
compared to larger companies, when they participate in standar-
dization. Therefore, they might try to enforce speciﬁc objectives,
after they have decided to make this rather high investment.
Consequently, the inﬂuence of the company size on speciﬁc stan-
dardization motives might be contradictory. In addition, alliances
in general and standardization committees in particular are more
attractive for smaller ﬁrms that lack the resources to invest in their
own R&D and that aim to beneﬁt from the knowledge disclosed
during the standardization processes. Smaller ﬁrms become in-
volved in standardization, because they get access to the often-
required complementary resources. Therefore, the general com-
pany size-driven argument might be counterbalanced especially
related to the ‘knowledge acquisition’ motive. Nevertheless, we
derive the following third general hypothesis.
Hypothesis 3. Company size has, in general, a positive inﬂuence
on company assessment of strategic motives to standardize.
In addition to the company size, empirical studies (e.g., Blind,
2006; Blind and Mangelsdorf, 2013; Wakke et al., 2015) reveal that
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Since strategically-important standardization decisions – i.e., the
development of standards related to market access – occur at the
supranational level, deﬁned as active participation of companies at
the European or international level, we expect a positive correla-
tion between supranational standardization activities and the
motives to standardize in general, and in particular the use of
standardization activities to facilitate market access and to pene-
trate international markets.
Hypothesis 4. Companies active in supranational standardization
have a stronger emphasis of strategic motives to standardize.
The existence of a patent department reﬂects an understanding
of the strategic value of patents (Blind et al., 2006). Likewise, a
standardization unit is related positively to the strategic motives to
standardize. Consequently, we argue in the same way related to
positive inﬂuence of a standardization department on the strategic
motives to standardize. We assume that ﬁrms with a separate
standardization unit can bundle their in-house competencies and
resources particularly related to technical regulations better than
ﬁrms without such a unit. Based on conﬁdential information about
companies having a standardization unit, it becomes obvious that
most of them have a broader focus on technical regulations as
such. Consequently, we expect ﬁrms with standardization units to
act more strategically related to inﬂuencing governmental reg-
ulations. However, links to other departments, e.g., R&D, could also
be better exploited in enforcing their standardization strategies:
Hypothesis 5. Companies with a standardization unit place a
stronger emphasis on strategic motives to standardize.
Finally, the competitive environment has a mixed inﬂuence on
companies' likelihood to join standardization and, consequently, on
their motives to standardize. On the one hand, the higher the com-
petition a company faces, the more standardization can help to re-
duce its technological and market risks. On the other hand, stan-
dardization might endanger a company's competitive advantage if a
competitor's solution is preferred or too much proprietary informa-
tion is revealed during the standardization without adequate com-
pensation. However, we expect that a high competition correlates
positively with the motive ‘knowledge acquisition’, because ﬁrms in
highly competitive markets are forced to become more innovative
also via relying on external know–how (see literature on Open In-
novation, e.g., Chesbrough, 2003; Laursen and Salter, 2006). Finally,
companies acting in a very competitive environment might use their
inﬂuence on the regulatory framework, especially relevant for com-
petition, to reduce the competitive pressure. By building market
barriers via developing competitors' cost raising standards, (Salop
and Scheffman 1987) companies can reduce the competitive pres-
sure. Consequently, we derive the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 6. Companies' competitive environments have an in-
ﬂuence on their assessment of strategic motives to standardize.3. Methodology and empirical results
3.1. Methodology
To empirically test the hypotheses developed in the last sec-
tion, we perform a two-step procedure. In a ﬁrst step, we rank the
importance of standardization motives that we obtain from our
company survey. With the help of an exploratory factor analysis,
we condense the reasons for involvement into a smaller number of
central standardization motives. In a second step, we analyze the
relationship between the standardization motives derived from
the factor analysis and ﬁrm level variables using multivariate OLSanalysis. From a methodological point of view, we use the same
approach as in the paper on motives to patent (Blind et al., 2006).
3.2. The sample
Before we present our typology of standardization motives
derived from the literature review, we describe the data used in
our analysis. We base our analysis on ﬁrm level data obtained from
a 2008 survey of German manufacturing companies in the elec-
trical engineering and machinery industry. A questionnaire was
designed in cooperation with representatives from two industry
associations (VDMA – the German Engineering Federation – and
ZVEI – the German Electrical and Electronic Manufacturers' As-
sociation). These two associations cover the majority of the com-
panies in their respective sectors, and as such our sample can be
regarded as representative.
In total, 375 companies answered the questionnaire, providing
a response rate of 9.38%. Thirty-eight percent of this sample are
small and medium-sized companies (SMEs) according the deﬁni-
tion of the EU. The remaining 62% have more than 250 employees.
The machinery industry accounts for 156 companies and the
electrical engineering industry for 169. The remaining 26 ﬁrms
represent the overlap between these two sectors, as some ﬁrms
are active in both the electrical and the machinery industry.
Seventy-one percent indicated to have participated in formal
standard setting processes (see Blind and Mangelsdorf (2013) for
further information). At the national level, 66% were involved in
the German Institute for Standardization or German Commission
for Electrical, Electronic & Information Technologies of DIN and
VDE. European or international standardization participation re-
presents 48% and 43% of the companies, respectively. In the em-
pirical part of our paper, we only use the answers of the compa-
nies that actively participated in standardization.
3.3. Motives to standardize
Standardization motives were derived from the large body of
literature about the motives for alliance formation summarized in
the literature review and complemented by the very few sources
focusing explicitly on motives of companies to participate in
standardization (e.g., Meeus et al., 2002; Blind, 2006). After several
meetings with representatives of VDMA and ZVEI, and the per-
formance of pilot tests including interviews with a few companies
being members of these industry associations, twelve company
speciﬁc motives to standardize have been included eventually in
the survey (see Table A2 in the Annex), reﬂecting industry-speciﬁc
considerations, the perception of company representatives active
in standardization and total length of the questionnaire. The re-
spondents were asked to rank the importance of each motive on a
ﬁve-point Likert scale. Table 2 presents the results.
The most important motive is to design industry-friendly re-
quirements of regulations through inﬂuencing underlying stan-
dards, i.e. companies ensure that standards, which often specify
the technical content of regulations or which implementation is
presumed to assure conformity with regulatory requirements in
general, are efﬁciently to implement. The second important mo-
tive is to enforce company-speciﬁc content in standards. Moreover,
the motives related to knowledge exchange, i.e., to achieve a head
start in knowledge, to acquire knowledge in undocumented dis-
cussions in committees, and to keep track of other companies'
technical knowledge are evaluated as being important, but less
than regulation-related motives.
3.3.1. Factor analysis
We condense the twelve motives to standardize, which have
been developed by applying the motives to form alliances to the
Table 2
Importance of standardization motives in formal standardization.
Standardization motive Rank Mean SD
Design industry friendly regulations 1 1.18 0.95
Enforce own content 2 0.82 0.85
Prevent formal standards that conﬂict with own interests 3 0.79 1.06
Solve industry speciﬁc technical problem 4 0.77 1.08
Acquire competitive advantage through head start in
knowledge
5 0.70 1.09
Prevent or anticipate regulation 6 0.64 1.10
Acquire knowledge in undocumented discussions in
committees
7 0.59 1.10
Reduce barriers to trade actively 8 0.55 1.09
Open up of new markets through formal standardization 9 0.54 1.03
Facilitate compatibility with producers of complementary
products
10 0.49 1.16
Keep track of other ﬁrms' technical knowledge 11 0.35 1.02
Solve company speciﬁc technical problems 12 0.06 1.14
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number of central objectives to becoming involved in standardi-
zation. We use exploratory factor analysis to identify unobserved
underlying factor structures. Exploratory factor analysis is a sta-
tistical technique used in social science to identify a relatively
small number of factors that can be used to represent relationships
among sets of many interrelated variables. In terms of mathema-
tical statistics, factor analysis is a method which tries to ﬁnd few
‘latent’ variables among many, not linearly independent ones. A
result, factor analysis shows if there are any latent variables, and if
so how many such latent variables (factors) exist and to what
extent these explain the variances between the cases (re-
spondents). Doing so revealed ﬁve factors which explain 68% of
the total variance as displayed in Table 3. Based on the literature
review, we deﬁne the following motives: Decreasing technological
and market risks; knowledge acquisition; market access; and
conformity to governmental policies. In this context, we now
discuss and interpret the resulting factors.
3.3.1.1. Factor 1: “Knowledge Seeking”. The ﬁrst factor has high
factor loadings with the following motives: acquire knowledge in
undocumented discussions in committees, acquire competitive
advantage through a head start in knowledge, and keep track of
other companies' technical knowledge. We interpret this factor as
an opportunity for participants to beneﬁt from the knowledge of
other ﬁrms disclosed within standardization committees' discus-
sions. This concerns both intended and unintended knowledgeTable 3
Exploratory factor analysis.
Factor 1
Enforce own content 0.017
Prevent formal standards that conﬂict with own interests 0.166
Solve company speciﬁc technical problem 0.035
Solve industry speciﬁc technical problem 0.058
Acquire knowledge in undocumented discussions in committees 0.879
Acquire competitive advantage through head start in knowledge 0.827
Keep track of other ﬁrms' technical knowledge 0.706
Design industry friendly regulations 0.086
Prevent or anticipate regulation 0.079
Open up new markets through formal standardization 0.331
Reduce barriers to trade actively 0.001
Facilitate compatibility with producers of complementary products 0.059
Notes: Factor analysis method: principal-component factors with orthogonal varimax rospillovers. The former means that ﬁrms acquire advanced knowl-
edge exclusively disclosed and required for standardization work,
which is not available to non-participants. The latter relates to the
knowledge from committee discussions that may reveal techno-
logical know–how of other participating ﬁrms, which is either not
necessary for the progress of standardization or not planned to be
used outside the core purpose of standardization.
3.3.1.2. Factor 2: “Market Access”. The second factor has high factor
loadings with the following three motives: opening up of new
markets through formal standardization, actively reducing barriers
to trade, and facilitating compatibility with producers of com-
plementary products. This factor is related to the possibility to
access markets both related to speciﬁc product and international
markets. On the one hand, standards help to achieve compatibility
with other products and components, becoming increasingly im-
portant in complex systems technologies. On the other hand, they
are able to reduce barriers to trade in international markets.
3.3.1.3. Factor 3: “Technical Solution”. This factor corresponds with
high factor loadings with the motives: solve company-speciﬁc
technical problems and solve industry speciﬁc technical problems.
This factor represents the beneﬁts resulting from synergies of
expert knowledge in standardization alliances. In other words,
technical committee meetings are held to discuss technical pro-
blems and ﬁnd solutions in line with the interests of the involved
stakeholders.
3.3.1.4. Factor 4: “Regulation”. The fourth factor has high factor
loadings with design industry-friendly requirements of regula-
tions via standards including preventing and anticipating regula-
tion. Therefore, this factor is clearly related to the function of
achieving ﬂexible regulatory framework conditions via
standardization.
3.3.1.5. Factor 5: “Company Interests”. The ﬁfth factor has high and
positive factor loadings based on the following two motives: en-
force own content and prevent formal standards that conﬂict with
own interests. The ﬁrst factor therefore represents a rather generic
or horizontal motivation insofar as technical experts in commit-
tees act on behalf of the company they work for and promote the
company's interests in all of the aforementioned issues.
In summary, we argue that the ﬁve factors revealed by the
factor analysis correspond well to the factors derived from the
literature in the previous section. On the one hand, they represent
the general motives to joining formal alliances presented in Ta-
ble 1. The factor ‘decreasing market uncertainty’ in the general
alliance formation motive corresponds with ‘company interests’
in standardization. ‘Knowledge acquisition’ and ‘ﬁrst moveFactor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 Factor 5
6 0.0571 0.0548 0.0521 0.8753
3 0.1952 0.0945 0.3614 0.6038
8 0.0479 0.8500 0.0727 0.1347
9 0.1967 0.7656 0.2041 0.1542
6 0.0125 0.0088 0.0413 0.0217
1 0.1736 0.0396 0.1935 0.0045
3 0.1235 0.1885 0.0986 0.1497
7 0.244 0.0627 0.8179 0.0715
4 0.0724 0.0580 0.8097 0.1205
4 0.7102 0.1076 0.0316 0.0867
5 0.7947 0.0924 0.2801 0.0048
2 0.7339 0.1893 0.1375 0.084
tation. Amount of variance explained: 0.68.
Table 4
Importance of standardization motives in formal standardization.
Standardization motive Rank Mean SD
Factor 4 “Regulation” 1 0.91 0.87
Factor 5 “Company interests” 2 0.81 0.79
Factor 1 “Knowledge seeking” 3 0.55 0.96
Factor 2 “Market access” 4 0.53 0.86
Factor 3 “Technical solution” 5 0.35 0.95
Notes: The mean is the average on a scale of 2 (¼ low importance) to þ2 (¼high
importance). SD¼standard deviation. n¼268.
K. Blind, A. Mangelsdorf / Technovation 48-49 (2016) 13–24 19advantage’ correspond to the ‘knowledge seeking’ motive of ﬁrms
in standards setting committees. ‘Access to markets’ in the general
alliance formation motives is associated with ‘market access’ in
standardization motives and ‘conform to government policies’
corresponds well with achieving ﬂexible ‘regulation’, which allows
easier compliance to regulation via standards setting in the con-
text of the New Approach. On the other hand, ‘technical solution’
represents a speciﬁc technology-oriented standardization motive,
as the original intention to standardize.
Table 4 presents the average importance of the motives from
the factor analysis. The most important factors are ‘regulation’ and
‘company interests’, followed by ‘knowledge seeking’ and ‘market
access’. ‘Technical solution’ is evaluated as being important, but
signiﬁcantly less than the other four factors.
3.4. Driving factors for standardization motives
3.4.1. Empirical model
We complete our empirical investigation by examining the
impact of ﬁrm level variables on the importance of standardization
motives as describes in Section 2.2. The dependent and in-
dependent variables are shown in Table 5. Dependent variables are
the condensed standardization motives that we obtained from the
factor analysis and are shown in Table 3. Independent variables are
R&D intensity (RD), the existence of market novelties (MN),
company size (SIZE), participation in supranational standardiza-
tion committees (SUP), the existence of a unit responsible for
standardization (UNIT), and competition intensity (COM). The
correlations between the independent variables are displayed in
Table A1 in the Annex.
In our investigation to ﬁnd factors explaining standardization
motives, we assume linear relationships between the im-
portance of standardization motives and the independent vari-
ables. Therefore, our ﬁve regression models are set up in theTable 5
Description and means of model variables.
Model variable Indicator
Dependent variables
Factor_1 Company interests Average importance of company i
Factor_2 Technical solution Average importance of technical s
Factor_3 Knowledge seeking Average importance knowledge se
Factor_4 Regulation Average importance regulation mo
Factor_5 Market access Average importance market acces
Independent variables
RD R&D intensity Expenditure on R&D divided by to
MN Market novelties 1 if a ﬁrm produced market novel
SIZE Firm size Logarithm of total turnover in 200
COM Competition intensity Average perceived competition int
low; þ2¼very high
SUP Supranational standardization activities 1 if a ﬁrm was only active in supr
0 otherwise
UNIT Standardization unit 1 if a ﬁrm has a unit responsiblefollowing way:
β β β β β β β ϵ= + ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ +
=i
Factor RD MN SIZE COM SUP UNIT
1.. 5
i 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
4. Results
The results of our multivariate OLS models are shown in
Table 6. The ﬁve different models can explain the differing degrees
of importance placed on standardization motives. The models
explaining the knowledge seeking motive and regulation motive
have the best ﬁt, whereas the interest motive and technical solu-
tion motive have the lowest ﬁt. Nevertheless, the results presented
below allow an assessment of the hypotheses presented in Section
2.2, as well as the interpretation of the control variables.
First, R&D intensity has the positive sign expected, and is sta-
tistically signiﬁcant in the knowledge seeking model and in the
market access model, as proposed in the Hypothesis 1, whereas it
has no inﬂuence in the other three models. We can conﬁrm that
R&D intensity has a positive impact on the knowledge seeking
aspect, complemented by the fact that a ﬁrm's ability to use ex-
ternal knowledge from standardization alliances depends on its
absorptive capacity. In addition, companies active in R&D are ob-
viously also interested in facilitating te market access for the
output of their R&D activities. However, standardization is not
perceived as a strategy to solve technical problems related to
companies' R&D activities.
Second, the relationship between producing market novelties
and the importance of standardization motives (Hypothesis 2) is
positive and statistically signiﬁcant in the case of the regulation
motive, but not related to the market access motive. The ﬁrst
ﬁnding conﬁrms that highly innovative ﬁrms participate in stan-
dards setting alliances in order to inﬂuence the technical content
of mandatory regulations, with the goal of facilitating the market
introductions of their innovations. The missing relationship to the
market access motive may have been covered already by the
closed related R&D intensity, because companies with R&D activ-
ities generally perceive the regulatory framework conditions re-
levant for the intended technologies and products to be developed.
Regarding Hypothesis 3, our results show that company size is
only signiﬁcantly negatively correlated with the importance of
importance of the knowledge seeking motive. Our regression re-
sults suggest that the importance of knowledge exchange de-
creases with ﬁrm size. Obviously, smaller ﬁrms with a small re-
source base-which also includes resources to innovate-useMeans (SD)
nterest motive (2¼ low importance; þ2¼high importance) 0.81 (0.79)
olution motive (2¼ low importance; þ2¼high importance) 0.35 (0.95)
eking motive (2¼ low importance; þ2¼high importance) 0.55 (0.96)
tive (2¼ low importance; þ2¼high importance) 0.91 (0.87)
s motive (2¼ low importance; þ2¼high importance) 0.53 (0.86)
tal turnover in 2007 3.99 (3.91)
ties between 2005 & 2007, 0 otherwise 0.67 (0.47)
7 4.85 (2.18)
ensity in domestic, European and international markets; 2¼very 1.28 (0.75)
anational standardization committees between 2005 & 2007, 0.85 (0.35)
for standardization issues, 0 otherwise 0.50 (0.50)
Table 6
Results of multivariate OLS models.
Variable Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 Factor 5
Knowledge seeking Market access Technical solution Regulation Company interest
RD (R&D intensity) 0.0383** 0.0284* 0.0117 0.00467 0.00196
(2.20) (1.73) (0.64) (0.30) (0.14)
MN (Market novelties) 0.212 0.0392 0.14 0.242* 0.129
(1.40) (0.27) (0.88) (1.77) (1.07)
SIZE (Total turnover) 0.0810** 0.0197 0.00534 0.0211 0.0132
(2.50) (0.64) (0.16) (0.72) (0.51)
SUP (Supranational standardizing) 0.035 0.362* 0.240 0.263 0.348**
(0.16) (1.88) (1.15) (1.44) (2.11)
UNIT (Standardization unit) 0.0309 0.102 0.0198 0.280** 0.159
(0.23) (0.79) (0.14) (2.28) (1.47)
COM Competition intensity 0.228*** 0.0136 0.0295 0.151* 0.0813
(2.65) (0.17) (0.32) (1.93) (1.18)
Constant 0.964*** 0.373 0.493* 0.820*** 0.978***
(3.68) (1.51) (1.78) (3.46) (4.69)
Observations 205 205 205 205 205
R-squared 0.095 0.046 0.013 0.091 0.053
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Using a case study approach, Riillo (2013) conﬁrms that small
compared to larger ﬁrms participate in standardization in order to
increase their technical knowledge base. However, our general
expectations that company size is positively correlated with the
assessment of standardization motives are not conﬁrmed.
The dummy variable for focusing on national standardization
activities is statistically signiﬁcant in the market access model and
in the company interest model. Obviously, ﬁrms participating at
the supranational (European or international) standardization le-
vels try to pursue their company interests and to gain access to
markets more intensively compared to ﬁrms only active in na-
tional markets. Therefore, the result partly supports Hypothesis 4.
The dummy variable indicating whether a ﬁrm has a standar-
dization unit shows the positive sign expected and is statistically
signiﬁcant in the regulation model. Firms with standardization
units act more strategically regarding regulatory issues in stan-
dardization, obviously due to existing synergies between stan-
dardization and regulation. Hence, Hypothesis 5 is only conﬁrmed
related to the motive of inﬂuencing regulation.
Finally, the variable for perceived competition intensity has the
expected positive sign and is statistically signiﬁcant for the
knowledge seeking and regulation model. We interpret this result
one the one hand as a driver of (small) ﬁrms in highly competitive
markets, seeking to increase their knowledge base by accessing
the knowledge of partner ﬁrms and other stakeholders. On the
other hand, ﬁrms in highly competitive markets are forced to
create more explicit strategies in regulatory issues. Obviously,
ﬁrms in highly competitive markets aim to inﬂuence regulatory
constraints in order to reduce the competitive pressure. Conse-
quently, Hypothesis 6 is partly conﬁrmed.5. Discussion
In summary, our research conﬁrms that formal standardization
qualiﬁes as a form of a strategic alliance. We relate existing general
motives to form strategic alliances to speciﬁc standardization
motives and derive an empirically-based taxonomy of standardi-
zation motives by means of a factor analysis. The exploratory
factor analysis reveals ﬁve broad clusters of motives to participatein standardization alliances: ‘knowledge seeking’, ‘market access’,
‘technical solution’, ‘regulation’, and ‘company interests’. The fac-
tors represent general motives for alliance formation, but also
reveal that some motives to form strategic alliances can be
grouped into more speciﬁc standardization motives.
The most important objective to participate in standardization
is to deﬁne technical speciﬁcations in standards documents in
order to prevent mandatory regulations. This motive is followed
by the objective to ensure that company-speciﬁc interests are in-
cluded in standards documents, which is supported by the recent
work of Ranganathan and Rosenkopf (2014) about companies'
voting behavior related to new standards proposals. The objectives
connected to knowledge ﬂows in standardization processes are
ranked third. The latter cluster includes the ability to acquire
knowledge from undocumented discussions in standardization
committees which conﬁrms Blind's (2006) notion that standardi-
zation processes themselves represent a channel for knowledge
acquisition. The knowledge seeking motive is followed by the
‘access to market’ motive, which means the opportunity of ﬁrms to
open up and establish new markets through standardization, to
achieve compatibility with complementary products, and to re-
duce barriers to trade in international markets. Finally, our analysis
reveals that ﬁrms participate in standardization in order to ﬁnd
technical solutions.
On the other hand, we develop a number of hypotheses re-
garding the relationship between ﬁrm level variables and the
general importance of strategic standardization motives – i.e., the
extent of strategic objectives in standardization committees – and
test them in multivariate OLS regression models. The empirical
results reveal the following new insights. A ﬁrm's ability to acquire
knowledge from alliance partners depends on its absorptive ca-
pacity measured by its R&D intensity (Hypothesis 1). Moreover, we
can conﬁrm that very innovative ﬁrms – i.e., ﬁrms producing
market novelties – have particularly high incentives to participate
in standardization in order to ensure that standards promote the
business success of their market novelties (Hypothesis 2). In
contrast to our general expectation, we cannot conﬁrm that larger
companies assess standardization motives more important than
smaller companies. Our results show that the correlation is sig-
niﬁcantly negative for the ‘knowledge seeking’ motive, and sug-
gest that small ﬁrms aim to increase their knowledge base through
K. Blind, A. Mangelsdorf / Technovation 48-49 (2016) 13–24 21participating in standardization alliances (Hypothesis 3). Firms
that participate in supranational standardization activities assess
the motives related to market access and company interests more
important than ﬁrms who are active at only at the national level
(Hypothesis 4). This result conﬁrms that strategically-important
standardization decisions occur at the supranational level. The
organizational setting, i.e., the existence of a standardization de-
partment, also plays a role in the assessment of standardization
motives (Hypothesis 5). Our results show that ﬁrms with a stan-
dardization unit regard the regulation motive as signiﬁcantly more
important than ﬁrms without such a unit. Regarding the compe-
titive environment of ﬁrms (Hypothesis 6), we ﬁnd that ﬁrms in
highly competitive markets put more emphasis on ‘knowledge
seeking’ and ‘regulation’ motives. We interpret this ﬁnding
as being a ﬁrms’ attempt to reduce the competition intensity
by increasing their knowledge base or inﬂuencing regulatory
requirements.
Our ﬁndings provide a number of contributions. First, we
provide a ﬁrst taxonomy of motives to standardize conceptually
derived from the alliance formation literature and empirically
conﬁrmed on the basis of a factor analysis by relying on our
company survey data. The factors reveal that the motive to
standardize can be structured along a multidimensional frame-
work not only including technological aspects, but also knowl-
edge management, market access, competition and especially
complementarities to the regulatory framework. The latter is a
European speciﬁcity partially originated and intended by the
New Approach. Consequently, we expand the ﬁndings by Axelrod
et al. (1995) and Riillo (2013) both by adding further drivers for
joining standardization alliances in addition to the size of the
alliances and the competition with rivals and by generalizing
their case study based-results by our quantitative approach based
on a company survey.
Second, we investigate the relevance of drivers for participating
in standardization for the ﬁve motives to standardize, which have
already been identiﬁed and conﬁrmed. In general, our empirical
results reveal that a two-step-decision perspective is needed to
adequately study the participation in standardization, i.e., com-
pany characteristics that inﬂuence the participation in standardi-
zation do not necessarily explain the relevance of all motives to
standardize. Most prominent is the contradiction between the
well-established positive link between company size and the
likelihood to join standardization alliances, and our new ﬁnding
that small companies involved in standardization identify the
knowledge seeking motive as being signiﬁcantly more important
than larger companies. This ﬁnding differs from the existing stu-
dies especially in biotechnology (e.g., see Arora and Gambardella
(1990) and Audretsch and Feldman (2003)) regarding strategic
alliances. They conclude that smaller companies are more inter-
ested in larger companies' assets, e.g. production capacities or
marketing channels, whereas larger companies seek to get access
to the knowledge of smaller companies. There are at least two
possible explanations for this divergence. On the one hand, the
type of knowledge exchanged in strategic alliances is different
than the information shared in standardization processes. In the
latter, small companies are also interested in meeting their cus-
tomers, i.e., getting access to their markets. On the other hand,
strategic alliances are typically closed networks, whereas formal
standardization processes are open to all interested parties. Con-
sequently, larger companies do not get exclusive access to the
knowledge of small companies. Overall, these reasons are able to
explain the high relevance of the ‘knowledge seeking’ motive for
smaller companies.
Since we ﬁnd that inﬂuencing regulation via standardization is
the most important motive, our paper is able to contribute to the
theory of “regulatory capture” (Laffont and Tirole, 1991).“Regulatory capture” deals with the situation when the regulator
follows the interest of the regulated industry instead of public
interest. According to the existing literature, possibilities to cap-
ture the regulator include outright bribes, campaign contributions
to politicians, and future lucrative employment opportunities. Our
paper shows that standardization is an additional channel through
which companies try to inﬂuence regulations according to their
interests which in some cases may contradict public interests.
Avoiding such opportunities for “regulatory capture” requires,
among others, well-balanced stakeholder representation in stan-
dardization committees that includes participation of consumer
and environmental groups.6. Concluding remarks
First, our ﬁndings have implications for theory. Due to the high
relevance of inﬂuencing regulation via standardization, the chan-
nels of “regulatory capture” addressed in the existing literature
have to be expanded. Whereas at ﬁrst glance the additional option
might be used for “regulatory capture”, it could also have an efﬁ-
ciency enhancing impact by reducing “regulatory capture” at all by
challenging the other rather inefﬁcient channels of “regulatory
capture”. Consequently, our ﬁndings call for theoretical work
about companies' strategies related to the interaction of existing
strategies of “regulatory capture” with standardization, but also
about the overall welfare implications of this new channel. Even-
tually, these new theoretical ﬁndings have to be empirically tested,
which represents a major challenge.
Finally, a set of implications for standardization management
and policy can be derived from these new insights. First, stan-
dardization managers, who are often either embossed in technical
or in legal environments, have to be aware of the multi-
dimensional motives to standardize. Obviously, the pure technical
aspects are of relatively minor importance. The high relevance of
the motives related to regulation reveals that companies active in
standardization are not only developing common speciﬁcations,
but are also trying to inﬂuence the regulatory framework. The
common interests inherent in engagement with formal SDOs must
be considered with respect to individual interests of participating
ﬁrms. Consequently, joining standardization means entering into a
speciﬁc type of coopetition. Involvement in standardization is ty-
pically a long-term commitment indicative of a strong interest to
cooperate, e.g., companies cooperating in standardization try to
open up new markets by deﬁning common standards, which ei-
ther reduce barriers to trade or achieve compatibility with com-
plementary products or systems. Still, competition occurs within
the standardization process through the selection of speciﬁc
technologies out of often numerous possible options, in which
many participants may have a stake.
Second, signiﬁcant knowledge ﬂows are apparent within
standardization processes, especially from larger to the smaller
German companies opposite of that seen in other types of strategic
alliances. SDOs are – as shown in Sherif (2015) for Chinese com-
panies – interactive learning spaces. Consequently, companies'
knowledge management, including their open innovation strate-
gies, must take these opportunities into account when considering
entrance into standardization. Company size remains an important
contingent factor.
Consequently, our results imply a challenge for the human re-
source management and organizational setting of a company
(Dokko and Rosenkopf, 2010). The human resource management
of a company has to ensure the adequate training for the staff
participating in standardization committees. It is important be-
cause the results show that standardization activities are not en-
tirely focused on technical questions, but much more on strategic
Table A1
Correlation matrix of the independent variables.





SIZE 0.074 0.213 1.000
[0.268] [0.000] [0.000]
COM 0.033 0.017 0.110 1.000
[0.620] [0.788] [0.099] [0.000]
SUP 0.081 0.026 0.135 0.024 1.000
[0.206] [0.661] [0.034] [0.703] [0.000]
UNIT 0.106 0.111 0.224 0.086 0.052 1.000
[0.096] [0.069] [0.000] [0.181] [0.388] [0.000]
Notes: Table displays pairwise correlation coefﬁcients. Signiﬁcance levels in
brackets.
Table A2
List of motives to standardize.
What corporate strategy does your company pursue when participating in
standardization activities (2¼ low importance; þ2¼high importance)?
1. Push proprietary matters
2. Solve company speciﬁc technical problem
3. Solve industry speciﬁc technical problem
4. Prevent standards that conﬂict with own interests
5. Acquire knowledge in undocumented discussions in the committees
6. Acquire competitive advantage through head start in knowledge
7. Keep track of other companies’ technical knowledge
8. Industry friendly design of regulations
9. Prevent/anticipate regulation
10. Tapping new markets through standardization
11. Actively reduce barriers to trade
12. Facilitate compatibility with producers of complementary products
13. Other strategies: …
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market access and seeking external knowledge. Therefore, the staff
involved in standardization activities, mostly engineers, should
also be knowledgeable about existing and future regulatory fra-
mework conditions and also about the research, innovation and
knowledge activities of their company. The multidimensional
motives to participate in standardization require that standardi-
zation activities are embedded in an organizational setting that
allows the cooperation between the R&D departments, innovation
management and units responsible for regulatory affairs.
In addition, we conclude with some policy implications of our
empirical ﬁndings. First, the multivariate OLS models reveal that
small and R&D intensive companies active in standardization put
more emphasis on knowledge seeking motives compared to
companies with moderate R&D spending. As such, public policy
should develop support schemes that enable companies with re-
stricted R&D capacities to participate in standardization activities,
as these companies will beneﬁt from the knowledge transfer
taking place within these discussions. This justiﬁcation comple-
ments ﬁndings regarding the general lack of human and ﬁnancial
resources of SMEs to participate in standardization (e.g., Blind and
Gauch, 2009), as further legitimation for public support. Second,
the development of consensus standards is obviously closely
connected to inﬂuencing the regulatory framework, such that both
SDOs and regulatory authorities have to assure the openness and
transparency of the standardization process in order to avoid
disadvantaging companies that are not involved. Overall, compa-
nies' participation in standardization has to be fostered in order to
exploit the knowledge pool of “insiders” more efﬁciently and to
avoid the negative impacts on “outsiders”.
Despite these contributions, our analysis has certain limita-
tions. First, the database covers two sectors and does not allow
general cross-sectoral conclusions; an extension to other sectors
would be appropriate to generate a more comprehensive picture.
In addition, our study focuses on companies' involvement in for-
mal standardization organizations, rather than other standards
development mechanisms such as consortia. This can be justiﬁed
by the currently strong focus of the machinery and electro-
technical industry on standardization alliances hosted by formal
SDOs, and reliance on the formal standards they produce. Fur-
thermore, the data covers Germany only. However, many German
companies have a very long and explicit tradition in standardiza-
tion, follow often speciﬁc standardization strategies and in general
active not only at the national, but international standardization
level together with companies from other countries. Consequently,
we can expect an explicit strategy that is more in line with our
conceptual argument in contrast to the passive (free-riding) be-
havior of companies in many other small European companies.
Finally, our hypotheses about the driving forces have only been
partially conﬁrmed. In conclusion, the expansion to other sectors,
countries and informal standardization consortia is a ﬁrst step to
explaining the relevance of the different strategic motives to
standardize more comprehensively. Particularly, the high re-
levance of the “knowledge seeking” motive for small companies
requires more in-depth investigation to ascertain the speciﬁc
characteristics of knowledge exchanged in formal standardization
processes and the inﬂuence of its openness on all interested
parties.Acknowledgments
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